but the latter is Dignaga's. Dharmakirti seems to have tried to conform the former to, the latter, and he went so far-as to say that the latter determines the former. But this trial met with failure, because the essential counter-relation is a transcendental meta-regulation, by which the logical necessity is determined within its internal logical space (antarvyaptivada), but the inductive reasoning cannot determine it without the external instances (bahirvyaptivada). With the proof of being momentary (ksanikatvanumana) as a turning-point, the inductive theorem was divested of its logical power. This transformation of meta-theorem produced a powerful effect on the negative indicator. existence would be cognized, and it cannot be otherwise. This implies that the existence has the completeness of conditions for cognition9). In his latter works, this condition is more strictly provided: the completeness of external conditions and perceptible object, and the conditional negative indicator is called "non -cognition of the perceptible object (drsyanupalabdhi)". Dharmakirti attached this condition in order to avert the theorem of his teacher Isvarasena, mere non-observation (adarsanamatra), and he restricts the existence within perceptible domain. Thereby he composes a logical necessity: Whenever it exists, it is necessarily perceived, and hence he converts it into a contrapositive form: Whenever it is not perceived, it never exists. This logical necessity is based on the ontological equivalent which is prescribed by transcendental condition. This is why this negative indicator is deemed, a variation of the essential indicator (svabhavahetu)10). The stock example of a svabhavahetu-inference is as follows: This is a tree, because it has a simsapa-ness; In the designated place, there is a tree, because there, is simsapa-tree (or simsapatva) there"). , is based on the ontological relation: (svabhava ->bhava). In his latter works, this negative regulation: (-svabhava-bhava) is transformed to the sadhyaviparaye badhakapramana (the determinator by which the logical indicator is negated on the assumption that the hypothetical property to be proved is conversed)13) This negative procedure is based on the negative indicator. Therefore it seems that svabhavahetu and anupalabhihetu mutually make a logical circularity. But this circularity proves their logical consistency.
(b) empirical aspect In spite of having the logical consistency, Dharmakirti restricts the negative indicator within the perceptible domain, and prohibits it to overstep into the pure logical space. As previously stated, we cannot determine whether a transcendent object exists or not. Only affirmative perception can determine only the perceptible object, therefore he interprets the negative function as paryudasa, not as prasajyapratisedha14). By paryudasa-negation in this context, we cannot determine the absence of the object without affirmative perception of the other objector perceptible empty domain. This negation always 22) (svabhavanupalabdhi) and the non-cognition of the pervading essential existence (vyapaka-svabhavanupalabdhi). The forme is the same as the negative indicator that is previously said. Here it is illustrated : Here is no smoke, because it is not cognized, in spite of fulfillment of conditions. When this essential existence is the pervading property, the former is transformed into the latter, which is the derivative form. In the designated place, there is no simsapa, because there is no tree there. This simsapa-example is remarkable, because it is the same as the example of svabhavapratibandha. Therefore this derivative negative indicator, indeed, lays the foundation for svabhavahetu, on which svabhavanupalabdhihetu is based. Here is a logical circularity, as previously said. In any event,
here, vyapakanupalabdhi is not completely separated from svabhavanupalabdhi.
In these early works, DharmakIr.ti classified the negative indicator into four groups: the affirmative cognition of counter object or counter effect, and the negative cognition of cause or perceptible essential existence. And he added four variations16). But so far as the negative indicator is concerned, svabhavanupalabdhi lays the foundation for the other negative indicators, because the negative cognition implies the affirmative cognition, and the negation in the negative indicators is premised on svabhavanupalabdhi-negation. The vyapakanupalabdhihetu "There is no tree" and the karananupalabdhihetu "There is no fire" is based on the svabhavanupalabdhihetu "It is not cognized". Consequently, the svabhavanupalabdhihetu is meta-regulation, and the others are object-regulations.
But his latter classifications disregard this different level. In HB, finally the negative indicator is classified into three groups: svabhava-anup., vyapaka-anup.
and karana-anup. Here vyapakasvabhava-anupalabdhi is transformed into vyapaka-anupalabdhi, which is on a level with svabhavanupalabdhi. In regard to this transformation, it seems that the prof of being momentary (ksanikatvanumana)
is a turning -point 17). In order to prove the property "being momentary" of the existence, the essential property of the existence is defined as "being capable of casual efficiency. Thereby the non-existence can be proved by only logical factor without perceptible verifications. From the standpoint of ontology, this proof aims at the identity of "being momentary" and "being capable of casual efficieency". In accordance with E. Steinkellner, these two properties are restored -1102- 5. the return to the controversial point, instead of conclusion The whole dispute seems to turn on the following point: Which negative funnction is to be adopted, paryudasa or prasajyapratisedha ? Strictly speaking, which interpretation of negative function is to be adopted, empirical or pure logical one ?
The former is premised on the formalized field theory (sakaravijflanavada, satyakaravada), and the latter, contrarily, is premised on the non-formalized field theory (nirakaravi jnanavada, alikakaravada). Though the boundary line between these frameworks is fairly flowing becau §e of their many dimensional ontology, it seems that Prajfakaragupta (svabhavanupalabdhivadin)20 accepts the former theory, and Dharmottara (vyapakanupalabdhivadin) accepts the latter. To say the least of it, each logical structure is respectively based on each own negative structural ontology, on the ground of the negative counter-relation21) 
